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Abstract
My paper is an attempt at the theorisation of identity from a materialist 
feminist perspective, drawing on the oral life narratives of hungarian women. 
I would like to contribute to the ongoing debates on the limits and value 
of identity politics for feminist political and ethical objectives. In my view 
identity is a discursive construct that is never finished but aspires to momentary 
cohesion. The basic social conditions for such a Self is multiplicity and 
equivalent relations of power. Such a non-repressive model entails two major 
changes to exclusionary conceptualisations of identity. one is the recognition 
of the connectedness of the Self to the other, that is the intersubjective nature 
of the Self. The other is difference, heterogeneity within the Self that is the 
condition for the former.
as a discursively mediated practice of telling a life, auto/biography 
is understood to be the narrative site for making sense of the Self. Its major 
function is to construct a coherent Self out of the heterogeneous socio-cultural 
positionings available at any particular moment of telling. This sense of 
temporay coherence is achieved through the articulatory practices of the 
genre, that is, through the narrative device of emplotment.
My data consists of eight life-span narratives shared with me by eight 
woman friends of mine. I analyse one of them, the life narrative by adél, in 
detail for a case study. I shall focus on the analysis of the dilemma of a relational 
identity which all these narratives are re/constructing as their central theme. 
The dilemmas are all formulated from a gendered position problematising 
the limits of being a woman in contemporary hungarian society. My major 
interest in the analysis is to see whether it is possible for adél, to subvert, or 
transform even, the dominant hegemonic relations of power.
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This paper is based on my Phd research that focuses on the discursive 




of their lifespan. This analytical focus on the construction of identity 
positions my work within the current feminist/queer debates on the gains 
and limits of ‘identity politics’. rosemary hennessy (1993) formulates 
this problematic for materialist feminist practice as a struggle to maintain 
the critique of social totalities like patriarchy, capitalism, racism and 
heterosexism without overlooking the differential positionings of women 
within these totalities. recontextualized within such a politics of discourse, 
my interest in the discursively constructed subject should be considered 
as a potentially powerful intervention in the exisiting assumptions about 
‘women’ in hungary, for and of whom a feminist theory should speak. 
reading through and through the transcripts of the nine interviews 
I made with my woman friends, I have identified two salient features of 
these lifespan narratives. First, I understood that my friends strategically 
appropriated the interview situation for their own purposes. They all tried 
to resolve a dilemma1  that was pulling them in opposing directions in the 
course of the recollection of their life stories. The other recognition came 
much later, a year or so afterwards. namely, that these women are telling 
their lives through their relationships to/with other peolple around them. 
They do not draw a sharp boundary between their self and the other/s. 
both features seem to call for a concept of identity that is not achieved 
at the expense of the exclusion of difference, the other but, rather, built 
upon it in a dialectical and dynamic way. as long as I was focusing on 
these women’s story as a struggle to forge a unified self out of a fixed set of 
heterogenenous discursive positionings, I was operating by an exclusionary 
model of the self. as soon as I ‘heard’ that their actual dilemmas are in 
fact recounted with a very strong sense of the interests of the other, 
the unity of the self took on a very different meaning. namely, that the 
recognition of the other should not necessarily mean a mutually exclusive 
choice between either one’s own interest or those of the other but an 
understanding that the self is not possible without the other. So the vexed 
question informing the women’s wish to resolve their respective dilemma 
may be reformulated as how to achieve a sense of a coherent self that is 
not constructed at the expense of the other2  but one that recognizes the 
indispensible necessity of the other for the self to come to be. In discourse 
analytical terms, these women’s endeavour may consist in a departure 
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from the available discourses of the self as a unified negativity and open 
them up to the expression of difference, to an intersubjective recognition 
of multiplicity without abandoning an autonomous self.3  For me this has 
the analytical insight that, instead of focusing on the auto/biographies as 
closed textual units, I should open up the apparent boundaries of the self/
genre and relocate them in the dynamic negotiation of an intersubjective 
multiplicity. Instead of focusing on the multiple discursive positionings of 
the female subject as distinct fixities and thus explaining the achieved unity 
through the construction of a homogeneous dominant subject position out of 
this heterogeneity of the self/genre from within the representation, I should 
understand these contesting discourses as emerging in relation to an other or 
others in the course of the re/constructing, achieving a momentary cohesion 
in a chain of re/articulations (Laclau and Mouffe, 1984).
I have found a feminist conceptualization of identity that allows for this 
intersubjective recognition of the other in alison Weir’s (1996) model. This 
model draws upon the heterogeneity of identity both within as well as outside 
the self in relation to the other. Instead of taking for granted that identity is 
necessarily a negativity, a product of the repression of difference achieved via 
the negation of non-identity and thereby reducing identity to the repression, 
exclusion of the other (meaning either the other self or otherness), she tries 
to provide an alternative ethical model that offers a set of distinctions drawn 
between various forms of identity and exclusion. She contends that not every 
form of distinction is an instance of violence. Consequently, the separation 
of the other from one’s sense of self should not invariably be reduced to an 
act of domination. In other words, she is arguing against J. butler’s (1990) 
claim that every form of identity is inevitably the effect of the workings of 
a masculinist sacrificial logic: one that always sacrifices the female other/
difference for the supressed unity of the male self/same. This argument 
leads us, says Weir, to “a simplistic equation of capacities for individual 
autonomy [individual identity] and collective solidarity [collective identity] 
with repression, and hence, with domination” (8). Identity would be 
reduced to an inherently painful process of violation of multiplicity and 
would leave feminist politics with no grounds for a mobilizing solidarity. 
Instead, she proposes a theory of identity formation as a partly pleasurable 
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process based on the acceptance of the non-identity of the other and the 
non-identity within the self. This model presupposes two major shifts 
from a sacrificial model. on the one hand, instead of a preoccupation 
with separation from the other, it emphasizes an affective connection, 
an intersubjective connectedness to the other. on the other, instead of a 
preoccupation with the repression of the other, Weir’s model emphasizes 
the recognition and acceptance of otherness as a capacity for participation in the 
social world of contested meanings. as a result, the exclusionary logic of the 
same/different, self/other binarism can be escaped through the recognition 
of connectedness of the self to the other. Identity comes to be defined 
as “a capacity for coherent expression of non-identity” (1996:12). In the 
field of political practice, this reformulation opens up the possibility for a 
politics of identity that can escape the submission/resistance realization 
of a sacrificial logic.
now if I reformulate my major research objective within this non-
sacrificial logic of identity, my aim is to show that what is at stake for my 
friends when recounting their life story to me is whether they can transcend, 
escape the self-centredness of the binary logic of the Same. Therefore, the 
question is to see whether there can emerge a discourse coherent with a 
non-exlusionary, relational model of identity and if so in what particular 
ways.
Taking up the theme from the point of view of the genre of 
auto/biography, the task is to conceptualize the genre in a way that is 
congruent with the acceptance of the non-repressive model of identity. 
The narrative genre of auto/biography then cannot be seen as an end 
product, as a structure of a set of generic features it possesses, but one that 
is emerging in the course of a dynamic negotiation process and one that 
achieves only a temporary fixity. Therefore, I see autobiography at the 
intersection of a narrated and a narrating event4 . retrospectively, from the 
point of view of the narrative clousure, it is a more or less coherent story 
of the narrator’s life, a narrated structure of the self. on the other hand, 
this story is emerging in the course of an interview, in relation to a listener-
researcher, and as such, it is a narrating event. The distinction between 
these two dimensions, in my opinion, serves as the corresponding aspects 
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of identity mapped onto narration. on the one hand, the heterogeneity of 
the various events articulated — in Laclau & Mouffe’s (1985) sense of the 
word — into a temporarily fixed coherence, providing a sufficient sense 
of closure through the narrative device of emplotment (riceour, 1991), 
should correspond to the multiplicity, the non-identity within the self. 
Whereas the claim that this emplotment is taking place intersubjectively, 
in view of a listener, informed by the narrator’s assumption that her story 
should be found to be an adequate approximation of her past not only by 
herself but also by the listener, should correspond to the non-exclusion of 
the other outside the self.
The picture is more complex, though. With regard to the narrated 
events, the stories emerging in the course of the emplotment have their 
own implied listeners, narratees (see genettes’ 1980 concept of voice) 
within the recounted stories themselves, which multiplies the relational 
nature of the genre. From this point of view, each story implies an other 
(individual or collective), a listener. The task of the analysis is to show how 
non-identity of the narrator is accommodated through the recognition of 
this listening, evaluating narratee-other. Similarly, with regard to the actual 
listener in the narrating event, the interviewer is not the only possible 
listener that the narrator-author may have in mind. The very fact that 
my friends are told in advance that the recording is going to be analised 
as part of a Phd thesis may open up the possibility of multiple prospective 
‘listeners’(readers) with their own criteria of adequacy. In both cases, the 
ultimate evaluation is beyond the control of the narrator. To the extent that 
she is not in control of her story’s interpretation she cannot be in control 
of her emerging identity either, precisely becuse it is oriented inevitably 
towards the other/s. The task of the analysis is to separate the listeners in 
the narrated and narrating events to show how the emerging life story is 
re-constructed in view of the implied and actual listeners/readers. 
What I have said about the genre so far has been focused on the 
specificities of the narrative from within the interview situation, theorizing 
from the point of view of the narrator/author only. This approach 
recognizes only an autobiography and leaves the moment of the actual 
analysis sealed off. In other words, such an approach would make me, 
35
Erzsébet barát
the analyst ‘absent’, albeit my active presence as the reader/biographer of 
these life stories. This analytical practice would implicate the relationship 
between the reader/analyst and text as binary opposites of each other, 
where reading/analysing is a passive, self-evident, transparent practice in 
relation to a completely active text which is apparently productive of one 
and only one obvious reading, that of mine. however, as Mchoul (1983) 
has defined practices of reading, they are active, interpretative engagements 
with texts, contingent upon the discursively mediated social and cultural 
positionings of a reader and thereby of her/his own autobiography. 
The intersubjective model of identity, however, necessitates the 
insertion of the listening/reading other in the narrating event. This will open 
up the boundaries of the narrated autobiography and recognize its intersection 
with the biography it is turned into in the course of the analytical dialogue 
I, as the reader/biographer, am engaging with it. I find Liz Stanley’s (1992) 
theorization of auto/biography instructive about this problematic of the 
reader/biographer. She contends that the majority of feminist retheorizations 
of auto/biographical writings have focused on the genre of autobiography 
only. This critique has deconstructed the canonized perception of the genre, 
epitomized in Philipe Lejeune’s concept of ‘the autobiographical pact’ by 
focusing on the intertextuality of the texts. according to them, life and 
constructed accounts of life are related intertextually and not via the unique 
mind of a human subject, thus enunciated by no one and everyone. The 
constituent multiple discourses speak referentially to and about one another 
only. Stanley warns against this unconditioned embrace of the Foucauldian 
“death of the author” (Foucault, 1972). She argues that what the denial of 
authorship does is “a very convenient death” at the historic moment when 
the various authoritative sources of exclusion, discrimination are named as 
“white middle-class male first World elite” (1992: 17). What this theoretical 
denial does is silence the authorial presence in the activity of theorizing. This 
is all the more problematic, as the alleged gain of this denial is supposedly 
the empowerment of the excluded. however, there are no means theorized 
for the emergence of this empowerment, other than that it is. also, argues 
Stanley, the ‘suicide’ of the author precludes any accountability on behalf of 
the analyst, and thereby maintains the powerful position of the authorial self 
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as the hidden inscriber of ‘the’ truth. (See Frazer, 1988, and ramazanoglu 
et al.,1993, critiquing Foucault’s concept of power). 
 This second point of critique takes me back to the problematic of 
the reader/analyst, which Stanley addresses in terms of the practical means 
of empowerment. once she puts the biographer on equal ontological 
grounds with the autobiographer, their ways of knowing are not in a 
hierarchical divison any longer. She claims that the relationship of/between 
biographer to/and the life of her subject is the same as the relationship 
of autobiographer to her own self: “[The auto/biographer] can exist only 
through [the] others, and as ‘they’ do not exist except through him[/her], 
‘he/[she]’ as an essential self does not exist either” (70). Consequently, either 
can be known only partially, depending on the socio-cultural situatedness 
of the auto/biographer. This inscription of the reader/biographer in the 
analytical discourse will locate the product, the auto/ biographical text 
within the process of its production, in agreement with what I have said 
about the intersubjective nature of the interview situation itself as the 
intersection of the narrated and narrating event. The central question 
therefore for a feminist research on auto/biography is “how is ‘life’ as it 
is lived in its comptexities reduced into the ‘life of ‘X’ ?” (ibid.: 26) The 
slash in the name of auto/biography (‘a form of life writing’) denotes this 
conjunction, the generic similarity in the ontological status of autobiography 
and biography, requiring the same analytical apparatuses. 
The dynamics of this process like approach to the genre exposes 
a dialectic embeddedness of the moment both of the telling and the 
analysis. The actual text of the analysis can be redefined then as follows: 
The autobiography of Friend as constructed by her, the autobiographer 
in the course of the interview, in relation to the listener/researcher, from 
within the contingencies of her life is then re-constructed by researcher, 
the biographer into Friend’s biography from within the contingencies of 
researcher’s own life in the course of the analysis, thereby writing her 
own, the researcher’s autobiography in the form of the analysis as well. 
Futhermore, to the extent one’s life is intersubjective, i.e. in and through 
the life of others, her autobiography is inevitably a complex of these 
others’ biographies, and, in turn, her life is inscribed in the autobiography 
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of those others as well. Therefore, in the former relay of the dynamism 
of the analysis, there should be a slash inserted in both occurrences of 
‘autobiography’, emphasizing the momentary articulation of intersubjective 
multiplicity of the self/genre. I define (oral) auto/biography then as a 
narrative site for constructions of identity depending upon the social/
cultural situatedness of the auto/biographer.
The problem with a deconstructionist approach to the auto/
biographical writing/reading self can be reformulated from the point of 
view of the non-materiality of ‘discourse’. In order to keep the insight gained 
through a concept of the subject-in-difference, a discursively constructed 
identity, as well as to theorize the condition for empowerment, what is 
necessary to develop is a social theory of discourse. That I have found in r. 
hennessy’s (1993) conceptualization of discourse as ideological practices. 
according to her (1993: 14), ideology is an “array of sense-making practices 
which constitute what counts as ‘the way things are’ in any historical 
moment”.
as hennessy puts it, “From the vantage point of ideology, the 
material can be understood as that which intervenes in the production of 
the social real by being made intelligible. at the same time, the discourses 
that constitute the material structures though which ideology works are 
shaped by the material relations which comprise economic and political 
practices” (75). This means that ‘reality’ whether in the forms of ‘women’s 
lives’ or ‘the feminist standpoint’ is always social. reality is inescapably 
an ideological construct that is unevenly and contradictorily shaped “at 
particular historic moments by divisions of labour and relations between 
state and civil society” (75). 5  This materialist understanding implies that 
the discursive activities of sense-making are the effect of struggles over 
‘’the truth”. From this follows, that autobiography as a particular way of 
knowing is ideologically situated within a social and historical context, and 
as such have a materiality in a twofold way. on the one hand, it helps to 
shape the formation of the social subjects as well as what comes to count 
as the ‘real self’. In this sense, auto/biographical writings are discursive 
sites of struggle over shared social meanings of what gets indorsed as 
truth about the self. on the other hand, auto/biographical texts are also 
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material as effects of struggle over the modes of reading they allow. as 
hennessy puts it, “reading[/writing] is the ideological practice of making 
a text intelligible” (1993: 14), practices of making sense “of and through 
the systems of difference available at any historical moment” (15).once 
meaning is defined as the effect of social struggle, any theory becomes only 
one specific discursive mode of knowing, whose specificity, when compared 
with other froms of cultural narratives, consists in a “more direct inquiry 
into the conditions of possibility of knowledge” (7) but cannot, precisely for 
that reason, provide a non-biassed position outside the existing discourses 
of a particular culture. This way the criterion of assessment of the various 
theories is not grounded in an unmediated referential ‘truth’ but in terms 
of legitimacy, that is on the basis of insight, the explanatory power and 
commitment to empowerment. From this also follows that a materialist 
feminist theory should be an ideology critique, one whose only means to 
make its own partiality visible is explicite accountability.
 Seen in terms of an ideology critique, Stanley’s aim is precisely to 
provide an accountable perception of the genre. She argues for a middle 
ground between the two major ideological positions pure referentiality and 
deconstruction. her argument is that the intersubjective and intertextual 
nature of the self/genre excludes a referential ontological stance, where 
selves are unified, essential, and therefore fully knowable, consequently, 
auto/biographies should be looked upon as recollections, descriptions of 
the actual lives of such selves. That is the relationship between life/reality 
and the text, the account of life as referential. Stanley sees this referential 
approach as the expression of a traditional Western “realist ideology” (62). 
on the other hand, the socio-cultural locatedness, the contingency of the 
self/genre, and thus that of knowledge, excludes a feminist deconstructionist 
position (See Stanton, 1984) as well as recognizes a purely inter/textual 
ontology, where life/self is exhausted by representation, resulting in the 
erasure of the morpheme ‘bio’ in the name of the genre, “auto/graph” 
(93). although she does not give any name to this ideology, I would like 
to call it an ‘ideology of the fictive’, which would be in agreement with 
Stanley’s distinction between a fictive vs. a fictional self when addressing 
the constructed nature of the self. 
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I would like to claim that any form of auto/biographical writings 
(i.e. auto/biograpies and theorizationas of auto/biographies) functions 
ideologically to the extent they inscribe our understanding of what selves 
should be, and how auto/biographies should be read/written. any auto/
biogrraphy is the interpretation from within the available conventions, as 
such the particular effect of ‘an ideology of the self’. These conventions 
are discursive practices of telling/writing of ‘one’s life’/’self’.
What follows from the feminist objective of accountability for 
my own research? Firstly, the conceptualization of identity as an 
intersubjective, retrospective textual construction from within the 
existing discursively mediated practices of writing/telling-a-life ‘now’. 
The ontological stance informing my definition is the following. There 
is no self without a representation of self, that is living as a human being 
entails reflexivity. human understanding is narrative in nature. as Charles 
Taylor (1985) contends, we make sense of the world and ourselves in it 
from within the stories we tell. Therefore, the major function of the auto/
biographical story is to be the means for a reflexive understanding of the 
self. Furthermore, representation is always intersubjective, and therefore it 
is necessarily located within a social relation to the other. Consequently, no 
human activity, including telling/writing a life, is possible except within a 
social relation. In this sense, auto/biography is a form of discursive practice 
of re/construction of the past as the major means of self-understanding.
Secondly, this stance, which I would call, after rosemary hennessy 
(1993), ‘postmodernist materialist feminist’, opens up two possibilities of 
accountability in the actual linguistic analysis. on the one hand, my major 
contribution to a feminist auto/bographical research could be by breaking 
down the boundary between the oral autobiography of my friends and 
that of my own implicated in my analysis. This would recognize that my 
theoretical analysis is only a particular form of reading, a highly fomalised 
engagement with the text, and as such, only one interpretation of the 
autobiographies competing for recognition as an adequate approximation. 
My research objective thus should be to foreground the immediate ways the 
autobiography of my friends engages me, hails me: Whether I accept the 
implied reader positions of their texts or resist and deconstruct them. I am 
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going to make my reading/analysis of these reader positions accountable 
through access to my own auto/biography in two ways. First, by way 
of focusing on the construction of events shared by my friends and me. 
Second, and more importantly, to accentuate the inherent situatedness 
of reading/telling an auto/biography I will give voice to my friends’ own 
interpretation of their autobiography. To achieve this, I will have a second 
round of interviews. I will give my friends the recording and the transcript 
prior to the interview and then discuss how they see it from the ‘now’ of 
this second interview. 
on the other hand, the contingency of auto/biography, the 
intertwined dialectical relationship between memory and fiction, life and 
auto/biography both in auto/biography and in lives as they are lived, 
requires that my textual analysis should focus on the linguistic means which 
imply referentiality. They can be identified by way of the following research 
questions: To what extent is the narrator constructed as an authorial author 
through the production of facts, dates, quotations or reporting from written 
or oral sources, in order to signal her competence as a reliable narrator? To 
what extent is the text told as if an inevitable product of those announced 
facts, how is the chronological ordering of the narration implicated in the 
construction of causality? 
These linguistic means of referentiality in turn, to the extent they 
implicate an other, the actual listener who is there to be persuaded, are 
the linguistic ways of intersubjectivity. on the one hand, details like dates, 
specific venues, names of participants, historic events, may construct a 
relationship between the author-narrator and the researcher-Listener as 
ones tracing down the ‘facts’ of a ‘life’. on the other hand, there can be 
details that pertain to images invoking atmospheres, emotional dispositions. 
deborah Tannen (1992:32), when establishing the similarity of literary and 
non-literary conversations, explores the role of the latter type of details and 
establishes it as “creating interpersonal [emotional] involvement” through 
the particular images they invoke. I would say these images will function as 
fictional sites of the intersection of the narrator and the listener’s emerging 
identities. To the extent the listener enters the images, the constructed parts 
of the narrator’s emerging self, the images will become part of the listener’s 
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self as well: narrator and Listener come to be through and through each 
other.6 
Analysis of the intersubjective nature of the auto/biographer’s 
identity in a first interview made with Adél 
For the current analytical purposes, I have chosen a three-hour long 
interview from the first round of interviews. This is a recording of the life 
span of adel, a middle-aged dentist, married with three children, who 
are studying at university. born in 1946, she represents in my data the 
generation of hungarian women born after the Second World War. There 
are three generations represented in my recordings: one born between 
the two wars, one right after the Second World War, and one born in the 
late 1950s, after the 1956 uprising, where I myself belong. The motivation 
behind this categorization is to see if these three major important historical 
changes in the hungarian socio-cultural context have any bearings on 
the specific ways women can see themselves. as I have mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, each woman friend identifies a central dilemma 
of her life in the course of the first interview. although the dilemmas 
themselves are different in terms of their specific ideational contents, the 
social dimension informing the construction as well as the temporary 
resolution of them, regardless the women’s generational differences, is the 
same: that of gender. In other words, to the extent a woman can achieve 
an acceptable temporary resolution in the course of the interview she has 
achieved a sense of personal integrity, and to the extent the construction 
of the dilemma is from within her gendered social existence, the emerging 
identity is a gendered one, whatever gender gets constructed to mean. as 
long as they succeed in resolving their dilemma, they will have succeeded 
in re/constructing a coherent gendered self. 
In adel’s auto/biographical re/construction, the dilemma is 
formulated explicitly twice as follows:
In Structural Unit 6:
dilemma:
The thing that has meant or caused a big big trouble in my life is 
the state of my career and my family. right from the first moment on. 
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That is, how can you do them both right? My father, when he told me 
how delighted he was that I was to become a dentist, because that is a 
very good profession, and I would be good at it, that’s what he said. I 
don’t know, the only thing he didn’t take into consideration is that one 
needs such physical strength and condition so that one ... to do it on and 
on throughout the years, always with a lot of patients is a tormenting 
effort... So that is my problem: where can I make concessions, after all it’s 
impossible to do everything. To do my best here [=in the surgery] as well 
as at home. Since bringing up three children is a tough job, mainly the 
first ten years, when you can’t sleep all night long, what’s more, you have 
to get up at least five times so that in the morning ... Then I thought that I 
... in the family ... [can’t keep from crying] I don’t want to cry now but, 
you know, I must hold my ground there to a maximum extent. Switch it 
off. [a few minutes’ break until adél calms down].
resolution:
I have told you about this before, that that ... in theory a lot of 
things, that is whatever in the theory could be learnt beside it [her family 
commitments], and and to participate in retraining, to go to conferences, 
and to exhibitions. So whatever could be soaked up I did but I didn’t 
have the opportunity to practice them. and ... I’ve had the role of a kind 
of fellow traveller.[...]
and I practice this profession on an average level but very 
conscientiously. oh, so I try to make no mistakes. at least never 
deliberately. I don’t think I’ve made any except for those, you know, 
people make many mistakes at work. but in the family, in my family life, 
I’ve tried to hold out perfectly. [...]and I don’t know if I could manage to 
do it but I think that the human aspect, that in my opinion, is very good, 
the way I do that. at least I think so. In the technical part, I suppose there 
must be a lot of mistakes but as in the course of years the patients return, I 
think that is also a relatively acceptable level. but the work I feel I’m good 
at is, is the human relationship, the human attitude, the...




oh, he’s very meticulous. he’s very accurate in everything 
[he=Kálmán, the husband]. Well, I’m not like him, simply not, I think 
it’s impossible. You can do only one certain thing accurately. You simply 
can’t do so many things with such precision. So I do lots of things. [She 
laughs] oh, my god!
resolution:
With us, for example that was a very big thing that Kalman was so 
talented in his own profession. and this satisfied me. That he could do so 
beautiful things. It is as if I had made them. [...] but for me ... anyway I liked 
it. I liked that he was so skillful. and I’ve always praised him because it’s 
very important for him to be, to be at least praised by someone, if nobody 
else then me .... ‘cause every one of us needs that.
The dilemma is openly centered around the retrospective self-
evaluation of her lifespan. What is at stake for her is whether she made the 
right decision between her career and her family ultimately in favour of the 
latter at various decisive points of her lifespan that get selected and therefore 
relevant. These nodal points of decision making are related to “choosing” 
to have a prospective career within medicine as a dentist because that was 
judged by her father to be ‘managable’ by a prospective wife and mother; 
to “choosing” her various workplaces depending on either her husband’s 
career constraints or that of her motherly commitments; to “choosing” to be 
a full-time dentist as well as a full-time working wife and mother of eventually 
three children. her re-emerging dilemma then can be reformulated as the 
extent to which she sees herself as one who has had to make a decision in a 
structurally prefigured, decided way, in which case it was never a ‘choice’. 
To put it in intersubjective terms: whether this exclusion in the interests of 
some other has been acceptable, and if so how much, or not.
The analysis I am going to do cannot be exhaustive. I will address 
only three questions. Two will focus on the construction of the selfhood in 
relation to the emergences of the dilemma, and this way on the narrator, 
while one question will focus on the details of the imaginary evoking 
an emotional bonding, and this way implicating me, the analyst, as a 
step towards accountability, opening up the closed boundaries of the 
autobiography. First, I want to identify how the flow of the biography gets 
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structured as a piece of narrative into smaller constitutive units and see 
where the dilemma emerges and what relevance the locations may have for 
the process of constructing selfhood. as part of the narrative structuration 
of the emerging life span I will focus on the importance of the non-verbal 
communication of crying and laughing, as the modality that opens up for 
the need for a non-repressive intersubjectivity. Second, I wish to analyse 
the central metaphor of ‘the fellow traveller’ and interpret it as the linguistic 
device for constructing a discursive site where — as a result of its intersection 
at the boundaries of various discourses – it can locate the discontinuous self 
into a temporary cohesion of identity. Finally, I will explore the imagery 
of the emerging constituent stories: the significance of their location and 
the kind of relationship they set up between narrator and listener. 
My ultimate objective is to see whether adel feels qualified to have 
her own voice heard as a member of the various social collectives or rather 
feels obliged to justify her right to have an autonomous voice, an identity 
of her own at any point of the re-construction. In other words: Can she 
feel a legitimate member as a woman of her communities or not?7  
The narrative structure of the auto/biography
Let me start the analysis by establishing the narrative structure of the 
auto/biographical text in order to locate the formulations of the dilemma 
within.
adel, like most of my interviewees, tries to follow a roughly 
chronological coverage of her lifespan. To that extent, the text is a narrative: it 
observes the linear order of temporal sequencing of events. What is different 
in the nine narratives is the textual means of patterning into bigger textual 
structural units. In case of the adel text, it is possible to identify two different 
principles srtucturing the chronological rendering of adel’s life events into 
meaningful narrative units. one structuring device is provided by her 
strategic use of the evaluative passages inscribed into the chronological relay 
of the reconstruction of her lifespan, thus referring the listener to her parents’ 
life. These moments emerge systemically, dividing up the flow of events into 
developmental stages, in fact into eight units where the emergence of the 
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parental model will always indicate the end/beginning of the developmental 
stages: little childhood/end of primary school/graduation/maternity leave 
with the first children/nine years of work in the region called Jaszsag/
dilemma & resolution/current life in Szolnok/recount of the resolution. For 
example, Unit 1 starts with “My hands were withered [when I was born] 
like hers [mother’s] from doing a lot of washing.” (Ki volt azva a kezem [mikor 
megszulettem] mint neki a sok mosasba); and ends with “So, they [parents] were 
very good people. We had a very beautiful childhood, indeed. It was when 
we learnt about my father that he is seriously ill that my brother said that 
as of now in this house there won’t be any laughing but crying. Well, ...it 
was,...well, it wasn’t quite like that, but nevertheless, indeed, we had a very 
beautiful family life. [CrYIng]” (Hat nagyon jo emberek voltak. Nagyon szep 
gyerekkorunk volt, tenyleg. Akkor, amikor edesapamrol megtudtuk, hogy nagyon sulyos 
beteg, akkor mondta a batyam, hogy ezutan ebben a hazban mar nem lesz nevetes, csak 
siras. Hat, ... ugy is, ... hat nem egeszen igy volt, de azert tenyleg, nagyon szep csaladi 
eletunk volt. [SIR]) The parental model indicates the first stage of adel’s life 
from birth to the end of her little childhood. 
The implied comparison between the childhood happiness as provided 
by her parents and that of her own nuclear family is elevated into an absolute, 
timeless and thus mythical measure through the strategic reemergence of 
these passages. however, there is some tension here. on the one hand, this 
childhood happiness is constructed as one provided by the two parents in 
the narrator’s voice. on the other hand, this happiness, the laughing is 
declared to have come to an end, to constant crying with the father’s illness. 
In my reading three things should be mentioned here. First of all, there is the 
degree adverb “indeed” (tenyleg) at the end of the sentence evalutaing her 
childhood favourably (“very beautiful”/nagyon szep). This is a metatextual 
device doing the intersubjective act of convincing, constructing the listener 
or the narrator, or both as one in need of persuasion. Perhaps it is only the 
listener, me who needs this device of referentiality, after all I was not there, 
and also this is only the fourth minute of the recording, so the narrator-
author is at the very beginning of the process of constructing herself as an 
authorial, thus ‘reliable’ narrator, not that I can recollect any sign of disbelief 
on my part either. The second peculiarity has got to do with the vocabulary 
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used here: the telling absence of any lexical item in the semantic field of 
death. Instead, it is the definitive change in the emotional state of the family 
from laughing to constant crying that implicates the “serious illness” as 
terminal without explicitly saying so. Since the father is dead for years at the 
time of the recording, and this I was also aware of through adel, this lexical 
supression of his death I don’t think is motivated by the maintenance of some 
narrative suspense for the sake of the listener. So the non-lexicalization of 
the death is pointing in the direction of the narrator, it is her who may be in 
need of persuasion. Taken together with the other two linguistic devices, the 
third specificity, namely the voice presentation technique, may provide an 
insightful interpretation that can explain why the narrator-author is in need 
of the persuasion so much so that she is broken down into unexpected tears 
in the course of the narrating. The death of the father, unlike the absolute 
happiness, is not recounted through the narrator’s voice at the time of the 
narrating but through that of the brother’s only reported by the narrator, this 
way evoking a past time belonging to the narrated event then and there. The 
corollary of this is that the narrator gets constructed as one of the characters 
listening to the brother’s gloomy prediction at the time back in the family 
house.The voice presentation and the choice of words have the combined 
effect of a subtle distancing: the narrator tires to stay outside the discourse of 
death. Consequently, to the extent the current tears are triggered by the old 
emotional disposition as evoked by the adel-character at the time they are 
intertextualized. however, to the extent the old tears are recontextualized 
within the favourable discourse of the evaluation of the narrating event ‘now’ 
they are a kind of meta-text, commenting on the lifespan retrospectively. but 
why is this evaluation in tears? This non-verbal communication inscribes an 
unfavourable question in the temporary equilibrium played out by the voice 
presentation techniques, implicating some unfavourable self-evaluation. as 
the re/construction goes on, I, the listener will learn in Unit 6 that the first 
tears were pointing in the direction of the tension caused by the dilemma 
regarding the acceptability of the decisions adels is constructed to have 
made. That is, the first instance of crying is related intertextually to the 
second, and only other instance of crying that coincides with the first explicit 
because self-reflexive wording of the evaluation crisis.
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as the few quotes in the evaluation passage above may indicate, adel 
is very reluctant to speak explicitly on her own behalf. It is not the voice of a 
self-reflexive ‘I’ assuming the responsibility of making the value judgements. 
The closest we can get to an ‘I’ is in the protective community of the inclusive 
‘we’ constructing her as either one of the four children (“We had a very 
bautiful childhood, indeed.”) or as a member of the whole of her family, 
parents included (“We had a very beautiful family life.”). Later on, in the 
course of these evaluative passages the other reference to herself is through 
the generic use of “a person” ( az ember). Take, for example, the very next 
evaluative passage, which introduces the second structural unit, that of the 
childhood years in terms of the existence of her own memories not just 
ones told to her, like the ones reconstructed in the first unit. The referent 
of the generic ‘person’ is established as ‘I’ through the possessive suffix ‘-m’ 
(equivalent of english ‘my’) and the possessive pronoun ‘sajat’ (‘own’) in 
the PP “from my own life” (‘a sajat eletembol’). “Well I can see from my 
own life, that this is so.That a person works from morning till night so that 
s/he8  can live. but this [work all day] did keep them [the parents] busy.” 
(Hat most a sajat eletembol latom, hogy ez igy van. Hogy reggeltol estig dolgozik az 
ember ahhoz, hogy meg tudjon elni, de ez[ az egesz napos munka] lekototte oket[ a 
szuloket]). These linguistic choices are constructing a person who has been 
forced to submit herself to the needs of her two families and by implication 
to her father and her husband. When I analyze her dilemma in terms of 
non-verbal communication, I’ll point out that it is precisely this ‘willing’ 
submission she cannot help crying about in the course of the narrating. 
The other equally possible interpretation for the domination of an 
inclusive ‘we’ is her strategy to use the occasion of the interview for writing the 
history of the life of her extended family; to use it as a tribute, an unexpected 
chance to give voice to her gratitude in public. hence the predominance of 
the inclusive ‘we’, the focus on the parents, even the grandparents and her 
four siblings, then on her husband and the three children. In fact 70 % of the 
interview time is dedicated to this oral family photograph.9 
This reluctance to construct the life story centered upon the ‘I’ takes 
us to the other possible structuring of the narrative, to a hierarchy of the 
structures themselves. as I have shown, the chronological ordering of the 
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numerous life events are structured into eight units measured against the 
norm of the parental model. There is another possible structure principle: 
the emergence of the autonomous voice of the self in and through the 
emergence of the dilemma. here, there are only three units. The first 
comprises the first five developmental stages of adel’s life, covering all the 
events of her life from birth to the moment of the actual recording, right 
before the beginning of the explicit formulation of her dilemma:”Well, I 
was born in 45.”/”So that now we are doing that more peaceful everyday 
routine, ... and in the meantime my children are growing. So that we have 
reached the stage where they are completely grown up.”( From: Hat ’45-
ben szulettem. To: Ugyhogy aztan azt akis nyogodtabb mindennapi munkankat 
csinaljuk, ... es kozben nonek a gyerekeink. Ugye, mostmar ott avgyunk, hogy 
egeszen felnottek, ...) all this is adel’s life always through a relation to some 
other/s. Then comes the eruption of the so far repressed voice of the self-
reflexive ‘I’ formulating her dilemma and the resolution; a unit dominated 
by the pronoun ‘I’. This takes up the whole of Unit 6. Finally there comes 
the third one, a return to the submitted/submissive voice of the ‘we’— 
comprising Unit 7 & 8 . This last unit closes on the resigned tone of a brief 
recontextualization of the dilemma and resolution. That is, the narrating 
comes to an end that emphasises the acceptance of her life as submitted. 
The dominant presence of the ‘I’ in Unit 6 is preceeded though 
on two occasions, in Unit 4 and 5. The difference is that these previous 
contexts are more mediated in the sense that it is the Character-adel that 
comes to be centered on in two stories related to her work experience, 
and thus the ‘I’ belongs in the narrated event. Whereas the context of 
the dilemma is more immediate in the sense that it is the narrator-adel 
who gets foregrounded as the self-evaluating ‘I’, and thus belongs in the 
narrating event. What is noteworthy about the two stories is that they both 
construct the adel-Character as succesful negotiator with the hostile public 
institutions: first with the local council in her first work place then with the 
staff of the local primary schools in the Jaszsag region, where she and her 
husband moved into after three years in their careers.This time I would 
like to explore the first story in order to reveal the contradictory positions 
adel takes up when evaluating her lifespan.
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This story is embedded in the context of how she got her first job 
after graduation and marriage, which were on the same day, observing her 
father’s demand not to marry before graduation. The contextualization of 
the decision making is as follows: “We ended up in dunaujvaros, because 
my husband had a scholarship. [...] and then his scholarship was for Fejer 
County. and it had the condition reading that [he] had to spend as many 
years in the county as many years they helped. [...] To nagykata [her 
parents’ place] we couldn’t go because, because, because, mmm, well as 
for me, in any case I wanted to get married at the time. My father said 
though that it would not be that important [Laughs], but this I did not 
want, this ...[...] That is I would have liked to go home otherwise, because 
my father had a complete [surgery] equipment, so I would have been able 
to work there, or we would have been able to work there ...So we got to 
dunaujvaros.” (Dunaujvarosba kerultunk, mert a ferjemnek osztondija volt [...] es 
akkor Fejer megyebe szolt az osztondija. Es ugy szolt az osztondija, hogy ahany evet 
segitettek, annyi evet ott kellett tolteni abban a megyeben. [...]Nagykatara [szulok 
lakhelye] azert nem mehettunk, mert , mert, mert , oo ugye en mindenkeppen akkor 
mar ferjhez\akartam menni. edesapam mondta ugyan, hogy nem lenne a olyan fontos 
[nevet], de en nem akartam, ezt a ...[...] Ugyhogy en szerettem volna egyebkent 
hazamenni, mert edesapamnak egy teljes felszerelese volt, tehat en tudtam volna ott 
dolgozni, vagy tudtunk volna ott dolgozni , ... Nahat elkerultunk Dunaujvarosba.)
What I would like to analyse here is the absence of self-reflexivity 
regarding the decision making itself. The extremely contradictory interests 
she had to negotiate across at the time are not commented on now. To 
this extent the narrator is not questioning the Character’s ‘decision’. 
nevertheless, the contradictory discourses expose the conflicting positions 
themselves across the various social dimensions of the character’s life at the 
moment of embarking on a supposedly autonomous life. To the extent the 
contradictions are exposed the multiple positionings call for the listener’s 
evaluation of the decision for herself, thereby functioning as a key narrative 
device for creating intersubjective involvement on behalf of the listener/
analyst. I can identify the following positions: there is the young woman 
whose wish to get married constructs a female character as a wife in relation 
to a prospective husband whose job options are limited by his scholarship; 
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there is the young dentist that constructs a character as the prospective 
employee at the job market eager to find a promising job; and there is also 
the daughter that constructs a female character in relation to her father as 
the prospective inheritor of the father’s dentistry equipment, as well as the 
grown up woman whose implied desire to practice sex constructs her as 
the non-submitting sexed female character, who cannot be the obedient 
because sexless girl/daughter of her father any more. once these positions 
are teased out, adel’s decision to follow her prospective husband comes to 
be constructed from within the discourse of sexual pleasure; the one that 
is not spoken but implicated only by the anaphora ‘this’ (ez) that which 
without a referent becomes an indexical pronoun, inviting the listener to 
find a referent for herself. The highly concealed ‘presence’ of the discourse 
of sexuality is a conspicuous feature of the whole narrative. This constructs 
the interview situation to count as a non-appropriate domain for sexual 
practices.
The actual story of success at work is forged from within the above 
context and starts like a disaster. not only did she have no job in town, 
but in a nearby village which meant commuting. Furthermore, the job was 
imposed on the local community, in fact because of Kalman’s scholraship. 
The authorities were obliged to give a job to the grantee and a dentist wife 
was only an extra burden. This way adel gets constructed as the dependent 
wife in the public domain of economy. She counts as a labour force in her 
husband’s rights only: even her degree comes to be engendered. but the 
story continues evoking an ardent, determined professional and a successful 
negotiator, who manages to win the appreciation of the local authorities 
and gets the money to furnish her own surgery. 
“Whereas I got a job in a nearby village. after all, my job was better 
than his [Kálmán’s], but I had the problem that I had been appointed. and 
at the time there was this shire municipality. I turned up to report and they 
informed me that, well, I had got the job but there is no place for me to 
work, because there is no surgery. no equipment, no surgery. Well at this 
I got very desperate. because, you see, I thought if I am appointed to a 
place, and if I get a salary, then somewhere I must commute every day. 
So that I bought a travel pass and every day I did go out to this nowhere 
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and was there in snow, and in rain. and at the municipality they told 
me after I had reported every day throughout a week that they are very 
fed up with me going there. because they had not applied fot this status. 
From here everybody commuted to dunaujvaros for dentistry. They did 
not want a surgey. If I want something then I should do it. Well this, this-, 
this was horrible. [...] Then the principal trusted me so much that I was 
given a stamp, as well as a check, and I commuted to Pest [budapest, the 
capital) to find the equipment.”
(“En pedig egy kozeli faluban kaptam allast, vegulis az en allasom meg jobb 
volt, mint az ove [Kalmane], csak nekem az volt a gondom, hogy kineveztek, es akkor 
meg jarasi hivatal volt, bementem jelentkezni, es kozoltek velem, hogy hat az allast 
elnyretem, de nincs ahol dolgozzam, mert nincs rendelo. Nincs berendezes, nincs 
rendelo. Hat ezen en teljesen ketsegbeesetm. Mert ugye en ugy gondoltam, hogyha 
en ki vagyok nevezve valahova, es hogyha en fiztest kapok, akkor nekem valahova 
miden nap ki kell jarni. Ugyhogy en megvettem a buszberletet es minden nap ki is 
mentem a semmibe es ott voltam a hoban es a vizben es a tanacson kozoltek velem, 
miutan mar minden nap megjelentem egy heten keresztul, hogy ok mar nagyon unjak 
azt, hogy en odajarok, mert ok nem kertek ezt az allast, innen miondenki bejart 
Dunaujvarosba fogaszatra, ok nem akartak ide fogaszatot, ha akarok valamit, 
csinaljam. [...]Aztan a jarasi vezeto ugy megbizott bennem, ugyhogy pecsetet kaptam, 
meg csekket kaptam, es Pestre jartam fol muszereket keresni”)
The more of the specific details of the first week in the adel-
Character’s work-place, the greater the impossibility of the situation 
becomes. In this sense, the means of referentiality, creating a trustworthy 
adel-narrator could be counter-effective, had it not been for the imaginary 
of the winter scene in this unnamed vilage, this ‘nowhereland’. I can see 
the fragile figure struggling with the severe whether condtions, making 
her way in the deep snow on an early freezing winter morning, tired with 
the early morning wake-up and bus journey, as if going nowhere in the 
strange village, ending up in fact in the office of the local authorities.This 
spatial continuity constructed between the winter street and the office 
implicates another continuity, that of the severe climate of the forthcoming 
negotiations. all these details are there to invite me, the listener to 
sympathize with this hero fighting with the snow and the authorities. and 
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I do. I am concerned about the outcome.
The story, to my engaged self’s relief, ends in the self-reflexive voice 
of the narrator-author making an unconditoned favourable evaluation of 
her first job, the first three years of her career: “So that I ran a very good 
school dentistry. I looked after the children while I had no equipment to 
work with. and also the usual enlightenment activities, talks, practicing, 
everything. So that in the end I loved to be there a lot. and, ... It was good 
to be there. I was by myself. it was good to be there. and then, in the 
meantime kalam finished his military service, and we moved from rents 
to rents. and every weekend we rushed home to my parents.”(Ugyhogy, 
nagyon jo iskolafogaszatot csinaltam. Szurtem a gyerekeket addig, amig nem volt 
mivel dolgoznom. Meg a szokasos felvilagosito munka, elodas, gyakorlas, minden. 
Ugyhogy vegulis nagyon szerettem ott lenni. Es ... jo jo volt ott lenni. Egyedul voltam, 
jo volt ott lenni. Aztan Kalman leduta kozben a katonasagot, kozben egyik alberletbol 
mentunk a masikba. Es minden hetvegen ugye rohantunk haza a szuleimhez.)
What is most relevant to me in this self-evaluation is the emphasis on 
an existence that is lonesome and this loneliness is evaluated absolutely 
positive. This successful negotiator and dentist is in fact an autonomous 
being, who is able to get her professional interests, values recognized by 
the state apparatuses. What’s more, who is also autonomous in relation to 
her husband. The loneliness is not that of the lonely wife since Kalman 
is said to return in the middle of all these fights to bring about a decent 
school dentistry. The ‘loneliness’ means that she has the space to make 
all sorts of decisions and very important ones, for that matter, by herself, 
there is no need for a ‘mutual decision making’ (see Unit 7 & 8). In fact, 
later on she adds that this was the only time when they were not employed 
by the same authorities or firms. That is, this is the only point in the auto/
biographical narrative when she comes to be the autonomous being who 
does not (have to) feel obliged first to justify her right to have her own voice 
in order to have it heard. and also, she can achieve it without any tedious 
structurally prefigured exlusions, which are otherwise at the expense of her 
own interests. Whatever exclusions she had to make in the course of her 
decisons about the surgery as long as there are no discourses undermining 
the equilibrium of this non-repressive identity, she is construcetd as a self 
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who does not have to differentiate her own interests from those of the 
others at the expense of repression: exclusion, delineating a difference, is 
not intertwined with repression. however, this period must come to an end, 
precisely when she becomes pregnant with the first child. at that point, 
the father reappears in the scene and gets a job for Kalman in the Jaszsag 
region, in adel’s, homeplace. and this pregnancy ‘happens’ to coincide 
with the end of the three years Kalman had to stay in dunaujvaros. adel 
is said to have come to love her job while Kalman is said to be unhappy 
about his. So adel’s chances to stay in the job are undermined twice, and 
in each case the division is gendered: the mother and the wife set against 
the dentist.
If I take into consideration this unique story of success, which is 
successful precisely because it is constructed from within the position of the 
autonomous being, I claim that the complex structural hierarchy of the life 
span narrative implies a reformulation of adel’s dilemma from an openly 
critical stance. Instead of the less political, less self-reflexive question ‘did 
I make the right decision between my career and family?’ we may have 
the unequivocal formulation: ‘Is it right to accept one’s submission to the 
patriarchal order?’, which is implicated by the structural hierarchy of the 
embeddedness and by the story of relational self-autonomy.
however, the formulation of the dilemma is from within a discourse 
of crisis over the non-availability of a non-repressive, inclusionary 
relation. The pattern of adel’s life is informed by a sacrificial logic. 
The actual hegemonic relationships she is constructed to be in are such 
that in the course of struggle over what counts as an acceptable or an 
unacceptable exclusion she can never forge a position from where 
she could achieve that to make a decision which inevitably implicates 
the exclusion of certain other interests, this exclusion should not be 
conflated with oppression/suppression of the other interests. To the 
extent the self is constructed through these decision making practices, 
she can never achieve an autonomous identity where the differentiation 
from the other would not have to be automatically threatening and 
thus to be ‘legitimately’ suppressed. That is to the extent her self is 
enmeshed within a dominantly heterosexual patriarchal hegemonic 
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society her chances to escape it are extremely low. So the only story of 
escape when it comes to the overall estimation of the lifespan through 
the dilemma is suppressed by the dominant hegemonic discourse. all 
she can do is cry about the lost chance. Lost because now she is all 
too tired and exhausted. In the last two minutes of the recording, her 
life is reconstructed as a long and continuous caring for the others at 
the expense of her self. The only effort she sees herself to be able to 
do is to carry on within the same constraints, to keep looking after the 
children till they finish their university studies and hopefully leave at 
least her weekends available for rest. 
“but big wishes like that,... well, for me, ... to travel I liked very 
much. That I did with great pleasure, things like that I was very happy to 
do with him [Kalman]. but great wishes I did not have any because on the 
one hand,... well, you see, I tried to look after my family, my own fanily, 
and then the bigger family, my mother and, and, then, my mother-in-law. 
all these duties we gradually also took on us because, ‘cause we had to. It 
was imperative. and from a distance it is difficult to do. and often I had 
the energy left only to have a rest. To sleep. ... and it is like that to date. 
Since the children are not home any more, only at the weekends, so after 
a very demanding week one has a very demanding weekend as well. one 
that is spent on doing household duties.”
(De olyan nagy vagyaim, ... ugy engem, .. utazni nagyon szerettem, azt nagyon 
szivesen, szoval ezeket nagyon szivesen csinaltam vele egyutt [Kalmannal]. ... De 
olyan nagy vagyaim nem voltak, mert egyreszt a ... hat hogy a csladomat igyekeztem 
ugye, a sajt csaladomat, es akkor utana a nagyobb csaladot, az edesanyamnak az 
ellatasat, az a, a, a , anyosomnak is az ellatasat. ezeket is lassan, lassan a nyakunkba 
vettuk, mert, mert kellett. Azt muszaj volt. Es tavolsagbol azt nehez. Es ugy, sokszor 
mar csak arra volt erom, hogy egy kicsit pihanjek is. Aludhassak. ... Es ez a mai 
napig is igy van. Mert, hogy a gyerekek mar nincsenek idehaza, hetvegeken vannak, 
valojaban egy eleg nehez het utan, az embernek van egy nagyon nehez hetvegeje. Ami 
kimondottan hazimunkaval telik el. [...] ).
The first explicit and only elaboration of the dilemma, as I 
have shown, is very belated. It emerges in Unit 6 with the ‘resolution’ 
following immediately. Then it returns in Unit 8, right before the end 
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of the interview, but very briefly, in fact only implicated by the explicit 
reformulation of the resolution. What is worth analysing about adel’s 
formulation of the dilemma is the non-verbal element, her dramatic break 
down in tears. The tears are revealing her resentment, her disappointment 
over her decisions, exposing them as structurally imposed upon her and 
as such not choices of her own. as effects of disappointment, the tears are 
working against the resolution anchored in the metaphor of the ‘’fellow 
traveller’. She has two reference points for the bitter comparison at this 
point. one is the husband, Kalman, about whom what has been worthy 
of mention before is that he is also a dentist and of the same age and 
they met at university and spent the five years of study together. Through 
this comparison they are constructed as equal at the start but through 
the series of changes of jobs in the course of their marital years she is 
constructed as the one left behind. Which is all the more painful for her 
from the point of view of her other reference point, that of her father. 
adel has considered him as a husband and father with absolute power in 
the family and as her ultimate ‘judge’: “That my father was an absolute 
directing person./When my father died it was such a blow for our family 
that, that we simply didn’t recover from it at all. We did not know what 
to do./It is fantastic how much she [my mother] learnt from my father’s 
skills and how much, how well she could direct us.’ (Hogy edesapam egy 
teljesen iranyito ember volt.;/ Ahogy edesapam maghalt, hat ez olyan csapas volt a 
csaladunknak, hogy, hogy egyszeruen ezt, hat nem is hevertuk ki egyaltalan, ...nem 
tudtuk, hogy mit kell csinalni; /fantasztikus, hogy o[edesanaym] milyen sokat 
atvett edesapam tudomanyabol es hogy milyen sokat, hogy szoval milyen jol tudott 
bennunket iranyitani). His unquestioned role as the head of the family was further 
supported by his excellent performance in his profession as a surgon. Adel described 
him earlier on as a dedicated, excellent professional: “Well, my father was a very 
good professional and dedicated his life entirely to it [his profession].” (Na most, 
az en edesapam nagyon jo szakember volt es es teljesen ennek elt.) 
In the course of the self-reflexive retrospective evaluation then the above 
passages from previous points of the narrative will intertextually reinforce the 
father’s presence as the ultimate judge over her engendered choice between a 
good dentist or a caring mother, daughter, daughter-in-law and a wife in the 
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family. This intertextual reference inscribed in the decision making scene of the 
dilemma erases a differentiation on the verbal level between the voice of the 
father and that of the Character-adel: she is fully submitting herself to his 
patriarchal will. She must have a degree, yes, but one that will not impede 
her ‘female duties’. but the voice presentation technique makes way for the 
critiquing voice of the narrator-adel. First this critique is partial when done 
in the free indirect speech — through the quasi-anaphora status of ‘I’ in the 
last clause, the presence of the future tense forms, and the disappearance 
of the reporting clause from before the last clause. This partiality opens 
up the boundary between the Character-adel and the narrator-adel and 
thereby giving way to an implied critique of the authoritative father and 
herself. after all, it was the father who made the choice on behalf of her, 
and she submitted herself to his will. In the next step then this partiality 
gives way to a fully critiqueing narrator-adel via the direct speech of the 
self-reflexive evalution of the narrator. In this context then the father’s 
expectation of her to make an good job is weighing down on her now and 
comes to be critiqued as the unbearable becuase impossible imperative.
The free indirect presentation of the Character-adel in the decision 
making scene:”When he said, my Father that he is very happy that I am 
going to be a dentist, because it is a very good profession, and that I will 
do this[the profession of a dentist] well.’ (Edesapam mikor azt mondta, hogy 
nagyon orul, hogy fogorvos leszek, mert ez egy nagyon jo szakma,es hogy en ezt jol 
fogom csinalni.)
The direct speech presentation of the speaking narrator-author 
‘here’ and ‘now’ explicitly critiquing her father: “I don’t know, but he did 
not take into consideration that how insensibly much of physical energy 
is needed for this.” (Nem tudom, csak azt nem vette figyelembe, hogy azert ehhez 
milyen eszmeletlen fizikai ero kell.)
I would say that it is this twofold measure represented by the two 
male figures, Kalman, the dentist husband and the surgeon father against 
which the assessment of her professional performance counts as a practical 
‘failure’. Therefore her conscious, i.e. verbal assessment of her decision for 
excellent performance in the family, the justifying reason/s for her decision 
cannot suppress the unverbalised emotional resentment and pain: Why 
were not they forced to make such a decision between career and family? 
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In discourse analytical terms, through this non-verbal modality of crying 
the division of labour comes to be engendered.
The first moment of crying very early on in the interview by the 
force of intertextuality bears upon this second instance and to that extent 
is implicated in the process of the reconstruction of the self at this moment. 
What is also of importance here to know is that when adel comes to the 
actual death of her father in the chronological relay of her life events 
(months after adel’s first child’s birth) in Unit 5, she is not crying. also, 
when she talks about the death of her mother and the conscienscious and 
demanding caring — so much so that she even goes on an indefinite unpaid 
leave off work — she performs for three months at her bed, she does not cry 
either. So the tears are not attributable only to adel’s pain over the vacuum 
the father’s death left behind. after all, that was not the case in the first 
instance either. The relationship between the tears and the father’s death 
can be explained through the passages after the restart of the recording.
When I turn on the recorder again at adel’s request, she asks me to 
recontextualise, to relocate her in the flow of the auto/biography. So what 
does not get recorded in her voice is recalled in mine: “You said about 
your dad that he asked you to take care of the children.” (Azt mondtad az 
apukadrol, hogy arra kert, vigyazzal a gyerekekre.) That is, it was in actual fact 
her father’s request on his death bed, only five months after her first child’s 
birth, addressed to adel to make the decision in favour of the family. The 
first occasion of her crying on the first mention of her father’s death from 
this point of view then can be interpreted as the emergence of the dilemma 
but kept in control. There is the dutiful daughter’s task yet to perform, that 
is first to pay tribute to the family with the overarching presence of the 
father and then she may dedicate some space to her own self. 
on the level of her non-verbal communication, her retrospective 
evaluation of the decision is negative. hence the crying. It is only on 
the verbal level where her “ultimate” assessment is favourable provided 
by the reconciliatory position of the metaphor of the self, the ‘fellow-
traveller’. The crying is the non-verbal answer to the unspelt questions 
addressed to herself: ‘Is this what he meant by that last order for me? did 
I get the priorities right? but then how could I expect myself to be a good 
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dentist as well? The crying is fusing the tension between the contradictory 
assessments.
The return of the dilemma at the end of the interview is also 
noteworthy for the non-verbal behaviour: for her laughter. The laughter, 
combined with an emotional exclamation constructing the speaker helpless: 
“oh, my god!” ( Jaj, Istenem!), is coreferential with the instances of crying. 
here again, on the explicit level of verbal communication the narrator-
author does not go back on her resolution. however, in terms of her 
emotional state she questions the validity of the reconciliation. 
This is not the only instance of laughter. The emergences of ‘laughing’ 
(like that of crying) seems strategic. Their function is to avoid an open, 
explicit confrontation with a particular character. The laughter can achieve 
this avoidance by indicating the tension of the contradictory points of views 
through ‘voicing’ the narrator’s less privileged position in comparision with 
a character constructed as the more powerful. For example, when telling the 
story of her elder sister, the only one of the four children who dared to fight 
with their father, the laughter works against the “tractable child”, the Character-
adel. The validity of this self-categorization on the verbal level is played out 
through the fragmented time-shifts: First there is the university student willing 
with a bit of reluctance to accept her father’s demand not to marry before 
graduation; then there is the little girl listening to the threatening row between 
her father and her big sister anchoring this obedience back in the early teens 
of age, functioning like the lesson to learn; and finally there is a shift in time 
back to the row between sister and father precisely about marriage which 
implicates adel as the tractable child again but now near graduation. In the 
course of this shifting back and forth in time there is no verbalized time left 
for continuing the parallel between the sister’s run-away and the Character-
adel’s silent stay. What we have is the embarrassed retrospective laughter of 
the narrator-adel now. “Well, for me this [to get married after university as 
demanded by their father] was not that difficult for me to do because, because 
I was a fairly tractable child. Well, with my elder sister, shall we say, it was a 
conflict situation. anyhow, she took after my father. I mean her nature. So 
they sometimes had awful fights, just for that reason. When she wanted to get 
married before graduation. Well the, it was ... that well, .... then you can go 
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out into the world. and then she even left (Laughing).’ (hat mondjuk, nekem 
nem volt olyan nehez ezt [diploma utan ferjhezmenni] megcsinalni, mert en elegge 
kezelheto gyerek voltam. Mondjuk a noveremnel az mar konfliktus helyzet volt. 
Egyebkent is edesapamra hasonlitott, mar termeszetre. Es ezert ok nehanyszor ugy 
osszevesztek, eppen ezert. Mikor ferjhez akart menni allamvizsga elott. vagy-vagy 
egyebkent valami mas miatt, hogy akkor ugye az volt, hogy na, akkor mehetsz 
vilagga! Es akkor meg el is ment [a noverem]! [Nevet])
In the light of this strategic, evaluative use of laughing in the course of 
the narrating, adel’s laughter at the end of the interview is intertextualized 
as the non-verbal questioning of the value of her husband’s excellence, 
named as his ‘meticulousness’. I also argue that what is not spelt out here 
verbally is the price of his so called ‘excellence’: adel’s self-sacrifice for 
him. In this sense, the final laughter is implicated as self-critique as well. If 
this reflexivity about the unequal share of duties should get verbalised, that 
would threaten the delicate equilibrium of the resolution of her dilemma 
recounted right here. It must get suppressed by the avoidance strategy of 
her embarrassed laughter.
Metaphors as devices for constructing a unified position of 
selfhood
The exact formulation of the metaphor of the self is as follows: 
“and ... some road-companion role I filled in. = I fulfilled the role of some 
fellow-traveller”. (es ... olyan utitars szerepet toltottem en be.) The various 
discourses brought in by the metaphor are as follows. Partly it bears on 
the tourism discourse of travelling (see mention of their favourite activity 
of travelling all over europe every summer in Unit 7). Furthermore, to 
the extent it is the trajectory of the whole of the lifespan the road comes 
to mean, it brings in the ethical discourse of existence. and read against 
the various instances of the physical demand this life is constructed to 
impose on the travellers, the metaphor brings in the economic discourse of 
hard labour. The self is constructed at the intersection of these differential 
discourses as a traveller embarking on a long and demanding journey 
about the destination of which there is only one thing to know, that it will 
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come to an end. “If either of us dies, then I don’t know how the other will 
....[survive it]. hmm. It’ll be hard, I think.” (Hogyha valamelyikunk meghal, 
akkor nem is tudom, hogy a masik hogyan fogja ezt ... Hmmm megeleni.), says 
adel in Unit 8, towards the end of the recording.
There is one more discourse brought to bear intertextually on this 
metaphor, that of the discourse of gender. To the extent the difficulty, the 
demanding nature of life is constructed to mean a series of various degrees 
of repression as a woman, this road is engendered, and by implication, 
the self that is constructed at the intersection of these discourses comes to 
be engendered as well.
What is important to mention at this point is that the emergences 
of the dilemma are intertwined with a discourse of existence through 
the thematization of death as well. It is framing the auto/biographical 
discourse of selfhood. I have pointed out the implication of death as the 
inevitable destination at the end of the life narrative. It is also constructed 
as inseparable from the very beginning of adel’s life. The recording starts 
like this:”Well, I was born in ’45. I was born in 1945, november 2nd. This 
was noteworthy, because I always added that I was born on ‘the dead’s 
day.’’ (Hat ‘’45-ben szulettem. 1945-ben szulettem, november 2-an. Ez azert volt 
erdekes, mert mindig hozzatettem, hogy halottak napjan szulettem.) That is, she 
was born on november 2nd, when in hungary people go to the cemetery 
to light a candle for the redemption of the souls of their beloved.  
 I would like you to explore the specific details in the subsequent 
passage before interpreting the relevance of the theme of death. She is 
described by the narrator as a newly born baby as follows:(Es megszulettem 
este,...Nem, nem este. Valahogy masnap reggel hajnalba. Es akkor ugyanugy ki volt 
azva a kezem, mint az o keze a sok mosasba.) The details regrading the exact 
timing of her birth are doing more than simply creating an authorial, 
reliable narrator. Intertextualized by the subsequent detail of the withered 
hands, they are also establishing an intersubjective rapport between 
narrator and Listener. The little folds in the hands become almost tactile. 
Their fragility when intersected by the image of the mother’s adult hands 
whithered by the hard labour of washing some lamb’s wool is setting 
the moving, highly emotional atmosphere of the next three hours. I am 
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invited to relate to the painful hardship implied by the withered hands 
to come. as the prospective trajectory at the moment of birth is implied 
through the parallel imagery between the mother and the daughter, the 
adel-Character’s life is engendered and is to be full of hardships.
how can I account for this intersection of the dimensions of existence 
and gender at the very beginning of the life in the light of the whole of it 
as it gets re/constructed? My explanation is that adel is doing more than 
resolving an emerging current dilemma of her life. To the extent the dilemma 
is engendered and also constructed as one that can traverse the whole of the 
lifespan its resolution is an explicit retrospective evaluation of her ‘lived life’ 
as a ‘woman’, extrapolating her dilemma as one concerning the whole life of 
a female being. I would say therefore that adel is using the recording situation 
in a strategic way as an occasion of the evaluation of her life from a gendered 
point of view: from her actual birth to the current moment of retrospective 
evaluation and through that, by implication, to her future death. The narrative 
is grappling with the questions of ‘has she lived her life successfully in terms 
of the gendered positions available for her against the abstract and absolute 
measure of death as well as against the specific end of her own life? how 
should she live it now that she has made the evaluation?
Through the universal discourse of existence adels gets constructed 
as the evaluator of her lifespan at the final moment of her death in the future. 
This existential position gets intersected by the discourse of gender at the 
moment of the now where the actual dilemma of an immediate concern 
gets sorted out with the help of the metaphor. This way the current moment 
of judgement of the narrating event gets extrapolated: if the immediate 
dilemma can be sorted out, that is, if the metaphor of the self can construct 
a position of resolution, then there is hope for adel to be able to arrive at 
a favourable assessment at the end of her life as well, then reconstructed 
in the genre of an obituary.
adel’s dilemma in the course of the re-emergence in Unit 8 is not 
accompanied by any tears any more, the laughter’s momentary disruption 
is resolved instantaneously. The peaceful equilibrium achieved through 
the metaphor is reinvoked here again through the happiness the other’’s 
achievemnnt can bring for her: (Nalunk peldaul az nekem nagyon nagy 
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dolog volt, hogy Kalman ilyen jo kepessegu volt a maga szakmajaban. es engem ez 
kielgitett. Hogy o olyan szep dolgokat tudott csinalni. Az olyan, mintha en csinaltam 
volna.[...] Es en mindig is sokat dicsertem, mert az neki nagyon fontos, hogy valaki 
legalabb dicserje, ha mes nem, akkor en.) The journey, the road ahead of the 
couple, is going to be covered under the same pleasurable conditions; 
there is no need to change. She is going to continue to be the supporter, 
the care-giver of/for the husband through the spacial extrapolation of 
the metaphor: throughout the journey, by implication bringing in the 
tradtional heterosexual discourse of marriage ceremony: ‘till death us do 
depart’. and this is intersected with the explicit formulation of the theme 
of death again, matching the opening theme of death in relation to her 
birth. The family photograph is framed within ethical imperative of a 
life worthy of living:(Es hogy olyan, olyan sok mindenben kiegeszitjuk egymast, 
hogyha valamelyikunk meghal, akkor nem tudom, hogy a masik hogyan fogja ezt 
... oo megelni.).
The anxiety is constructed to be caused by the equal sense of loss 
the other should suffer from. We have the two apparently identical and so 
undistinguishable characters suffering from the loss of the partner. however, 
what I have explored before throughout the multiple positionings in the 
lifespan narrative should undermine this resignant favourable closure. The 
momentary cohesion of the self can immediately be shattered by asking 
the question: What exactly are they going to suffer once left by themselves, 
alone? Kalman to the extent he is dependent on adel’s unconditioned 
support for his social existence is going to suffer from all sorts of services. 
how is he going to secure another source? Whereas in adel’s case I cannot 
help intertextualizing the state of loneliness and ask: Might she be able 
to regain some autonomous existence again, like at the very beginning 
of her career? or is her exhaustion unredeemable? either way, this 
hypothetical extention of the reading process is here only to prove that the 
achieved cohesion at the end of the narrative is indeed momentary. In this 
sense, the whole process of the narrating event itself is only a contingent 
moment in adel’s life. Therefore, the emerging autobiographical text once 
reconstructed in/through the interview achieves only a temporary fixity, 
but as such it opens up infinite prospective re-readings and re-writings, 
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through which it can potentially reshape her life and that of any other 
reader/writer engaging with it, like myself, or you now.
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Notes
 1 I am using ‘dilemma’ defined by Michael billig et al. (1988:163) as 
“social situations in which people are pushed and pulled in opposing 
directions...[that] impose an assessment of conflicting values ... born out 
of a culture which produces more than one hierarchical arrrangement of 
power, value and interest”. In their example, gender in contemporary 
industrial society is a dilemma informed by the ideological dilemma of 
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the liberal individual evolving around the vexed question of how far to 
generalize in a ‘fair’ society. To the extent that human variation of the 
needs in the allocation of rights and resources as goal to be achieved in 
a ‘fair’ society can be seen to be obscured by gender categories they are 
considered to impede a ‘fair’ social structure. however, categorization in 
terms of gendered groups contravenes not only the value of individuality 
but that of human equality as well in so far as gender imposes differences 
between human beings and thus precludes human equality, the value 
on which the autonomy of the individual is based on.
 2 See the whole tradition of feminist thinking about the concept of 
‘identity’ going back to Simone de beauvoir’s The second sex. There 
she argues that personal or collective identities are always achieved in 
opposition to, and therefore through an attempt at excluding an other. 
That identity is a ‘negativity’ because it is necessarily the product of the 
hierarchical subject-object divide: the negation of the (female) object 
by the (male) subject.
 3 I am aware of a tradition in feminist writings on autobiography that 
assumes the differences of women’s autobiographical writings from that 
of men instead of considering this difference as the objective of their 
research. These assumptions are summed up in dona Santon’s (1984) 
critique in The female autograph. The so-called female qualities should be 
a fragmented, digressive narrative; a highly confessional mode through 
themes from the personal, private domain of life; and finally an emphasis 
on the relationship of the self to the other. Stanton’s deconstruction of 
this latter ‘feature’ contends that this manifestation of difference may 
be interpreted in fact as a strategic conformation to propriety and thus 
not indicative of any ‘real’ difference. Instead, she theorizes women’s 
autobiography as a source for changes in women’s life, as “an act of 
self-assertion that denied and reversed women’s status” (14).
  I agree that no list of apparent ‘features’ can be the legitimate 
objective of a critical theorization. (See Foucault, 1991: 389, on the 
meaning of critical analysis: one tries to see how these different solutions 
to a problem have been constructed; but also how these different 
solutions result from a specific form of problematization). however, 
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Stanton’s alternative interpretation of the salient presence of the other as 
well as the theorization of the genre is problematic to me on two accounts. 
Firstly, she fails to satisfy her own critical expectations when she does 
not problematize the contents of this ‘propriety’, leaving the dominant 
normative expectations regarding women’s behaviour homogeneous. 
Secondly, what she in fact fails to provide is an explanation that escapes 
the binary essentializing logic of the dominant/resistant divide. as a 
result, against her best theoretical intentions, her alternative explanation 
enmeshes women’s autobiographical practices further in a masculinist 
ideology. For the emphasis on propriety implicates women as enacting 
‘the’ norm and leaving them with the only option of a resistance to it 
through the “therapeutic purpose” of self-assertion. What she fails to 
see from such a position is that this resistance is always already being 
presupposed by the norm, leaving women with the possibility of re-
action, depriving them of any theorization of the chances of pro-action 
that should be informed by a non-hierarchial theorization of ‘difference’.
 4 The distinction between the narrated and the narrating event for 
analytical purposes in oral history research was drawn by K. borland’s 
“That’s not what I said”: interpretative conflict in oral narrative research. In: 
S. b. gluck & d. Patai (eds.): Womens’ words: the feminist practice of oral 
history. routledge, 1991. I think her distinction should be informed by 
the work of gerard genettes’s (1980) Narrative discourse.
 5 Later on I should take this up and try to match this with the non-
repressive model of identity.
 6 deborah Tannen provides the following example at the beginning of 
her article: “I wish you were here to see the sweetpeas coming up”(ibid.: 31). 
She compares this with a version where the non-finite clause, which I 
underlined here, is missing and claims that the evocative force of the 
first version is provided but the detail of the sweetpeas through creating 
an image that can function as an emotional trigger against the second 
version’s abstract idea of absence.
 7 This reformulation comes from John Shotter (1993:7), who provides 
a “rhetorical-responsive [conception of identity]” focusing on what it 
means to have one’s own voice as a result of the discursive negotiations 
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we engage in in relation to others, and how that voice is revealing of 
our identity. The criterion for becoming a citizen of a community is to 
have a voice listened to as of right.
 8 The hungarian language does not differentiate amongst the personal 
pronouns in terms of gender. There is only one third person singular 
pronoun for human beings ‘_’. The semantic distinction that is made 
is in terms of humanness. So all the referents that are non-human will 
be referred to as ‘az’, etimologically the same as the demonstrative 
pronoun ‘az’ (that). Therefore my choice with the slash inserted in ‘s/
he’ is the representation of this non-existent distinction.
 9 It would be interesting to see here the various explicit ways of self 
positionings as members of a social collective or through the attribution 
of a common feature to oneself or through the possession of a collective-
typical referent. See my own analysis of this feature in barat, 1997:141-
144).
